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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 
CURRICULUM: CAN PARENTS OPT THEIR CHILDREN 
OUT OF CURRICULAR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE? 
Kevin Rogers & Richard Fossey * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right of the parent over the child is prior to the right of 
the State. 
Hillaire Belloc 1 
Several states, primarily in the Northeast, have approved 
same-sex marriage either by legislative action or judicial 
decree,2 while thirty states have amended their constitutions to 
prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriage.3 In those states 
where same-sex marriage has been approved, we can expect 
* Kevin Rogers is Assistant Superintendent of Secondary Instruction for the Lewisville 
Independent School District in Lewisville, Texas. Richard Fossey is the Mike Moses 
Endowed Chair in Educational Administration at the University of North Texas. 
1. HILLAIRE BELLO(\ ESSAYS OF A CATHOLIC 177 (1931). 
2. See, e.g, Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Puh. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) 
(statutory ban on same-sex marriage violates equal protection provisions of the state 
constitution); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (statutory ban on same-
sex marriage violates equal protection clause of Iowa Constitution); Goodridge v. Dept. 
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (statutory prohibition against marriage of 
same-sex couples fails rational basis scrutiny under Massachusetts Constitution). See 
also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 457: 1-a (2010) (recognizing same-sex marriage). 
3. Paul Benjamin Linton, Same Sex Marriage and the New Mexico Equal Rights 
Amendment, 20 GEO MASON U. CIV. R. L.J. 209, 209 n.l (201 0) (lists the following state 
constitutional provisions that prohibit same-sex marriage: ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; 
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX,§ 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 83; CAL. 
CONST. art. I,§ 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II,§ :H; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; GA. CONST. art. 
I, § IV; HAW. CONS'!'. art. I, § 23; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16; 
KY. CONST. § 233a; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. 
art. 14, § 26i3A; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 3i1; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. 
1, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; 
OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § i15; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 51; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D. 
CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 32; UTAH CONST. 
art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § liJ). 
423 
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same-sex marriage and sexual orientation to become part of the 
public school curriculum-at least any aspects of the school 
curriculum that deal with sexuality.4 
As same-sex marriage becomes more and more widespread, 
conflict is inevitable between schools that seek to present 
same-sex marriage as a legal and morally acceptable 
alternative to traditional marriage and families who object to 
same-sex marriage on religious or moral grounds.5 For 
example, the Roman Catholic Church,6 the Southern Baptist 
Church,7 the United Methodist Church,g and The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints9 all disapprove of 
homosexuality as a matter of religious doctrine; together these 
four groups have almost one hundred million adherents in the 
United States. 10 
This paper does not consider the development of same-sex 
marriage in the United States in any detail, and the paper 
expresses no opinion about the wisdom of same-sex marriage 
from a public policy perspective. Rather, the premise of this 
paper is that conflict in the public schools over sexual 
4. See LEARNING AI30U'I' SEXUAL DIVEI{SITY AT SCHOOL: WHAT IS AGE 
APPROPRIATE? SAFE SCHOOLS COALITION, http://SafeSchoolsCoalition.org/whatisage 
appropriate.pdf (last updated July 2009) (suggesting that primary school children 
should be instructed about sexual orientation, including homosexuality and 
bisexuality). 
5. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 511 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (parents sought to 
shield their children from positive portrayals of same-sex marriage at their children's 
elementary schools). 
6. CATECHSIM OF THE CATHOLIC CHUHCH ~ 2357 (1994) (stating that homosexual 
acts are contrary to natural law and can be approved under no circumstances). 
7. Position Statement on Sexuality, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE SOUTH J•:RN 
BAPTIST CONVENTION, http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/pssexuality.asp (last visited May 2, 
2011) (homosexuality is not a "valid alternative lifestyle"). 
8. UNITED METHODIST CHURCH BOOK OF DISCIPLINE ,I 65 G (20{H) 
("[T]he practice of homosexuality is incompatible with Christian teaching."). 
9. Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Same-Gender Attraction, ENsrr;N, .July 1995, at 7, 7, 
available at http://lds.org/ensign/199fill 0/same-gendE,r-attraction ?lang=eng ("Every 
Latter-day Saint knows that God has forbidden all sexual relations outside the bonds of 
marriage."). 
10. See PIO:W FOHUM ON RELIGION & PU13LIC LIFE, RELIG!OUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN 
OPPOSITION TO HOMOSEXUALITY 6 (2003) (finding that 61'% of "committed white 
Catholics" and 88% of "committed white evangelicals" consider homosexuality to be 
sinful, and that 71% of black Protestants considered homosexuality to be a sin). A 2010 
report by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that support for gay 
marriage among white Catholics had grown in recent years, while white evangelical 
Protestants continue to oppose same-sex marriage overwhelmingly. PEW FORUM ON 
RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN OPPOSITION TO 
HOMOSEXUALITY 5-6 (2010). 
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orientation is inevitable in those jurisdictions in which same-
sex marriage is approved. In states where same-sex marriage 
has been adopted, either by statute or judicial decree, school 
systems will undoubtedly begin portraying same-sex marriage 
in a positive light, bringing school curricular decisions into 
conflict with families whose religious beliefs condemn 
homosexuality and same-sex marriage. To avoid this conflict, 
clear statutory provisions should be adopted to allow parents to 
shield their children from instruction regarding sexual 
orientation, just as statutes already exist that permit parents 
to opt their children out of instruction on sex education. 
Currently, forty-four states allow parents to exempt their 
children from instruction on sexual topics, either by statute or 
administrative regulation. II The language and scope of these 
statutes and regulations vary considerably from state to state, 
but the fact that so many states give parents some legal right 
to shield their children from sexual topics in the public schools 
is an indication that state legislatures recognize parents' 
sensitivity about the manner in which sexual topics are 
presented to their children. This paper will examine 
curriculum opt-out provisions that currently exist and suggest 
a model statute that will allow parents to opt their children out 
of any curricular activity that discusses sexual orientation.I 2 
11. DO PARENTS HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SHIELD 
THEIR CHILDREN FROM EXPOSURE TO SEXUAL TOPICS IN A 
PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM? THE SHORT ANSWER IS "No" 
In the venerable cases of Meyer u. Nebraska 13 and Pierce u. 
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, I4 the 
Supreme Court articulated and affirmed the constitutional 
right of parents to direct the education of their children. In 
both cases, the Court identified this constitutional right as a 
11. Tommy Kevin Rogers, Parental I{ights: Curriculum Opt-Outs in Public 
Schools (Aug. 2010) (unpublished dissertation, University of North Texas) (on flle in 
the university library at the University of North Texas, Denton, Texas). 
12. See also Marc D. Stern, Liberty u Equality: /~quality u. Liberty, 5 NW .• J.L. & 
Soc. PoL'Y ~l07 (2010) (proposing model statute in same-sex marriage states to protect 
rdigious liberties of persons opposing same-sex marriage). 
I :l. 262 U.S. :l90 (192:1). 
11. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Meyer v. Nebraska, decided in 1923, Robert Meyer, a 
teacher at a Lutheran parochial school, taught the German 
language to a ten-year-old child at the school in violation of a 
Nebraska statute that criminalized the teaching of a foreign 
language to any child who had not completed the eighth grade. 
Meyer was convicted of this offense and fined $25. 15 Although 
the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld Meyer's conviction, the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down the statute at issue, finding 
that Meyer had a constitutional right to teach the German 
language and that parents had a corresponding constitutional 
right-lodged in the Fourteenth Amendment-"to engage 
[Meyer] ... to instruct their children." 16 No emergency had 
arisen, the Court noted, that would justify this restriction on 
teaching the German language. Therefore, the statute was 
"arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within 
the competency of the state." 17 
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy 
Names of Jesus and Mary, 18 the Supreme Court examined the 
Oregon Compulsory Education Act, adopted in 1922 by a 
voters' initiative that required all children ages eight to sixteen 
to attend a public school until they had completed the eighth 
grade. Parents who violated this law were guilty of a 
misdemeanor. The Ku Klux Klan and the Scottish Rite Masons 
had been primary supporters of the law, "whose members 
believed in the superiority of white Protestants and the 
inferiority of blacks, Jews, Catholics, and immigrants," and 
who had come to the conclusion that closing parochial schools 
and forcing all children into public schools "would fortify 
American democracy." 19 The Society of Sisters of the Holy 
Names of Jesus and Mary, a religious order operating a 
parochial school in Oregon, and Hill Military Academy, a 
nonsectarian private school, challenged the statute in federal 
15. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100 (Ncb. 1922), reu'd, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
:i90 (192:3). 
16. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 400. 
17. !d. at 10:1. 
18. 2G8 U.S. fi 10 (1925). 
19. ,Joseph Vitcritti, 13laine's Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, and 
State Constitutional Law, H ARVAIW J .L. & I'UH. l'OL'Y (1998). 
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court, and they obtained an injunction barring enforcement of 
the law. The State of Oregon then appealed. 
Adopting the reasoning of its earlier decision in Meyer, the 
Supreme Court struck down the Oregon law. Under the 
doctrine of Meyer u. Nebraska, the Court declared, "we think it 
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with 
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing 
and education of children under their control."20 As the Court 
explained, parents have a constitutionally guaranteed liberty 
interest in directing the education of their children, which 
cannot be infringed upon by arbitrary and unreasonable 
governmental action that is outside the competency of the 
state. 21 In short, "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon 
which all governments in this union repose excludes any 
general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing 
them to accept instruction from public teachers only."22 
Together, Meyer and Pierce established that parents have a 
constitutional right to direct the education of their children. 
Pierce made clear that parents have a constitutional right to 
send their children to private schools and that the state may 
not abolish private schools or force all children to enter the 
public school system.23 
In the years since Meyer and Pierce, parents have brought 
suit repeatedly, seeking to extend the holdings of those two 
landmark decisions to include some parental voice in the day-
to-day operations of the public schools. In essence, parents in 
these suits have argued that their constitutional right to direct 
the upbringing of their children included some authority to 
control the content of the public school curriculum. 
In seven federal appellate court decisions, parents have 
argued that their constitutional right to direct the education of 
their children, first articulated in Meyer and Pierce, entitled 
them to shield their children from exposure to instruction or 
materials that were objectionable to the parents on religious or 
moral grounds. Unfortunately for the parents who brought 
20. l'icrce, 268 U.S. at 5:31-:l5. 
21. ld. 
22. /d. at 5:l1. 
2:i. In another decision from the same era, the Supreme Court issued a corollary 
ruling in action against the territorial government of Hawaii. Not only could 
government not abolish private schools, it could not regulatP them so onerously as to 
dfectively put them out of business. Farrington v. Tokushige, 27:l U.S. 281 (1927). 
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these cases, the federal appellate courts were entirely 
unsympathetic in all seven cases. 
A. Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education 
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education24 is the first 
federal appellate court decision in a line of cases that have 
rejected parents' attempts to veto a public school district's 
curricular and instructional decisions. In that case, seven 
families, all identifying themselves as "born again 
Christians,"25 sought to shield their children from exposure to a 
Tennessee school district's reading program, which utilized the 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston basic reading series. Vicki Frost, 
one of the plaintiffs in action, served as the plaintiffs' chief 
witness, and she testified that the reading series presented 
ideas that were objectionable to the plaintiffs on religious 
grounds, including such themes as "secular humanism," 
"supernaturalism," "pacifism, and "false views of death."26 
At the trial court level, the parents made two constitutional 
arguments. First, they argued that the school district's 
curriculum interfered with their constitutional right to direct 
the upbringing of their children as affirmed in Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters. 27 Second, they maintained that the school district's 
requirement that their children be subjected to the approved 
reading curriculum interfered with their right to free exercise 
of religion. 2s The trial court found in the parents' favor and 
enjoined the school district from imposing its reading 
curriculum on the unwilling families. 29 
At the appellate level, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
did not address the parents' arguments under Pierce, and 
Pierce was not mentioned in the majority opmwn. 
Nevertheless, the appellate court rejected plaintiffs' other 
constitutional argument-that they had a free exercise right to 
shield their children from parts of the curriculum that they 
found objectionable on religious grounds. The court 
21. 827 F.2d 1058 (fjth Cir. 1987). 
25. !d. at 1061. 
26. /d. at 1062. 
27. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Pub. Schs., G17 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (E.D. Tenn. 
1986), reu'd sub nom. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (Gth Cir. 
1987). 
28. Sec id. 
29. /d. at 1201. 
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acknowledged that the school district could not force students 
to affirm a belief in a particular idea, but the school certainly 
had the authority to offer a reading program "designed to 
acquaint students with a multitude of ideas and concepts."30 
The court went on to say that families who send their children 
to public schools were expected to adopt an attitude of civil 
tolerance. 31 Such an attitude "does not require a person to 
accept any other religion as the equal of the one to which that 
person adheres. It merely requires recognition that in a 
pluralistic society we must 'live and let live."'32 
B. Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc. 
In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 33 decided 
in 1995, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled very much in 
harmony with the Sixth Circuit's Mozert opinion. In Brown, 
parents of students in the Chelmsford School District of 
Massachusetts sued the district after their children were 
exposed to an AIDS and sex education program presented by a 
contractor named Suzi Landolphi and that allegedly resorted to 
sexually explicit and ribald language. Specifically: 
Plaintiffs allege that Landolphi gave sexually explicit 
monologues and participated in sexually suggestive skits with 
several minors chosen from the audience. Specifically, the 
complaint alleges that Landolphi: 1) told the students that 
they were going to have a "group sexual experience, with 
audience participation"; 2) used profane, lewd, and lascivious 
language to describe body parts and excretory functions; 3) 
advocated and approved oral sex, masturbation, homosexual 
sexual activity, and condom use during promiscuous 
premarital sex; 4) simulated masturbation; 5) characterized 
the loose pants worn by one minor as "erection wear"; 6) 
referred to being in "deep sh-" after anal sex; 7) had a male 
minor lick an oversized condom with her, after which she had 
a female minor pull it over the male minor's entire head and 
blow it up; 8) encouraged a male minor to display his "orgasm 
face" with her for the camera; 9) informed a male minor that 
he was not having enough orgasms; 10) closely inspected a 
minor and told him he had a "nice butt"; and 11) made 
:lO. 827 F.2d at 1069. 
:n. Id. 
32. !d. 
:1:1. 68 F.:ld 525 (1st Cir. 1995). 
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eighteen references to orgasms, six references to male 
genitals, and eight references to female genitals. 34 
At the time that the controversial AIDS program took place, 
the Chelmsford School Committee had a specific policy in place 
reqmrmg "positive subscription, with written parental 
permission" before students could participate in any 
instruction on the topic of "human sexuality."35 In addition, a 
Massachusetts statute gave students the right to opt out of 
"instruction on disease" if the instruction conflicted with the 
student's "sincerely held religious beliefs."36 According to the 
plaintiff parents, the school district had violated state law and 
its own policy when it exposed their children to the 
controversial AIDS program without giving them advance 
notice of the program's content and the opportunity to have 
their children excused from attending.37 
A federal trial court dismissed the parents' complaint, and 
the First Circuit affirmed the trial court's decisionY~ In spite of 
the fact that the school district had arguably violated state law 
and its own policy by exposing children to the AIDS program 
without obtaining parents' permission, the First Circuit 
refused to recognize any right of redress based on those 
apparent violations.39 
In addition, the appellate court emphatically rejected the 
parents' claim that the school had infringed upon their 
constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children, 
concluding that the Supreme Court's holdings in Meyer and 
Pierce did not give parents the right to control what public 
schools taught their children: 
The Meyer and Pierce cases, we think, evince the principle 
that the state cannot prevent parents from choosing a specific 
educational program-whether it be religious instruction at a 
private school or instruction in a foreign language. That is, 
the state does not have the power to "standardize its children" 
or "foster a homogenous people" by completely foreclosing the 
opportunity of individuals and groups to choose a different 
path of education. We do not think, however, that this 
:l1. !d. at 529. 
:l5. !d. at 5:l0. 
:J6. !d. at 5.'35 (citing MASS. G~:N. LAWS. ch. 71. § 1(1995)). 
:l7. /d. at 5:l0. 
:l8. Id. at 5:lO, fi11. 
:J9. See id. at 5:J9. 
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freedom encompasses a fundamental constitutional right to 
dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they have 
chosen to send their children. . . . If all parents had a 
fundamental constitutional right to dictate individually what 
the schools teach their children, the schools would be forced to 
cater a curriculum for each student whose parents had 
genuine moral disagreements with the school's choice of 
subject matter. We cannot see that the Constitution imposes 
such a burden on state educational systems, and accordingly 
find that the rights of parents as described by Meyer and 
Pierce do not encompass a broad-based right to restrict the 
flow of information in the public schools.40 
C. Parents United for Better Schools v. School District of 
Philadelphia 
Brown u. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc. was 
followed by five more federal appellate court decisions that 
refused to extend the constitutional right of parents to direct 
the upbringing of their children to include a right to prevents 
schools from presenting their children with objectionable 
materials about sex. In Parents United for Better Schools, Inc. 
u. School District of Philadelphia Board of Education, 41 a group 
of parents sued the Philadelphia school district seeking a 
permanent injunction to prevent the district from distributing 
condoms to students. In implementing the program, the school 
board affirmed that abstinence from sexual activity during 
adolescence "promotes good health and a healthy lifestyle."42 
Nevertheless, the school board concluded that the distribution 
of condoms to students was good public policy, partially as a 
means of reducing the risk of teen pregnancy and the 
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. The school 
district's condom-distribution policy specifically gave parents 
the option of refusing to allow their children to participate, 
stating that parents "have the absolute right to veto their 
child's or children's participation in the program."43 
In seeking to enjoin the school district from implementing 
its condom-distribution program, the parent group argued that 
the program fell outside the school board's lawful authority and 
,10. /d. at fi:J:l-:l1 (internal citations omitted). 
11. 118 F.:ld 260 (:lrd Cir. 1998). 
12. /d. at 26:l. 
1:J. /d. at 261. 
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violated parents' constitutional right "to be free from 
unnecessary governmental intrusion in the rearing of their 
children."44 Even though the school district allowed parents to 
bar their children from receiving condoms, the plaintiffs 
maintained that the district had no legal authority to be in the 
condom -distribution business. 45 
Ruling on the school district's motion for summary 
judgment, a federal trial court dismissed the parent group's 
suit, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The 
Third Circuit ruled that the school district had the legal 
authority to adopt its condom-distribution policy and that the 
policy did not intrude on parents' constitutional right to direct 
the upbringing of their children.46 Although the Third Circuit 
recognized ''the strong parental interest in deciding what is 
proper for the preservation of their children's health," the court 
did not believe the school district's policy intruded on that 
right. 47 Participation in the program was voluntary, the court 
pointed out; and the program specifically reserved to parents 
the option of refusing to allow their children to participate.4x 
D. Leebaert v. Harrington 
In Leebaert v. Harrington,49 Turk Leebaert sued a 
Connecticut school district, arguing that his constitutional 
right to direct the upbringing and education of his son Corky 
required the school district to excuse his son from all health 
education classes, not just those that dealt with human 
sexuality. Leebaert argued that this constitutional right 
stemmed from Meyer and Pierce and was "fundamental," 
requiring the school district to show that it had a compelling 
interest in pursuing its curriculum that overrode Leebaert's 
constitutional interest. 50 
Connecticut law authorized the State Board of Education to 
develop a family-life curriculum guide for the public schools, 
which would include such topics as family planning, human 
11. !d. at 270. 
4G. !d. 
16. !d. at 275. 
17. /d. 
Hl. /d. 
19. :l:l2 F.:ld 1 :l1 (2nd Cir. 200:l). 
50. !d. at 1 :l(J. 
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sexuality, parenting, and various aspects of family life; but 
Connecticut law further provided that no student could be 
compelled to participate in a school district's family life 
program. 51 School authorities had excused Corky Leebaert 
from participating in six classes in the seventh-grade health-
education curriculum that addressed human sexuality and 
AIDS, but the district insisted that Corky attend the other 
classes, including classes that discussed issues pertaining to 
the use of tobacco, drugs, and alcohol. 52 
Apparently, Leebaert insisted on shielding his son from the 
entire health education class because he suspected the class 
would expose his son to values that were objectionable to him 
on religious grounds. 53 For example, he suspected some of the 
instruction would contradict his traditional view of marriage-
that a married man and woman is the basic unit of the 
family. 54 According to Leebaert, "The school teaches that this 
unit can be comprised of anything or anyone, that anything you 
say can be a family. This contradicts my religious beliefs."55 
Relying heavily on the First Circuit's Brown decision, the 
Second Circuit rejected Leebaert's argument that the school 
could not require his son to attend health education classes 
unless it could show that it had a compelling government 
interest that overrode Leebaert's constitutional right to direct 
the education of his son. 56 "Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny do 
not begin to suggest the existence of a fundamental right of 
every parent to tell a public school what his or her child will 
and will not be taught," the First Circuit wrote. 57 Indeed, the 
court observed: 
[R]ecognition of such a fundamental right-requiring a public 
school to establish that a course of instruction objected to by a 
parent was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state 
interest before the school could employ it with respect to the 
parent's child-would make it difficult or impossible for any 
public school authority to administer a school curriculum that 
51. !d. at 1 :!5. Under Connecticut law, "no student shall be required hy any local 
or regional board of t>ducation to participate in any such family life program which may 
be offered within such public schools." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-16e (2009). 
52. Leebaert, ;);)2 F.:ld at 1:l7. 
5:3. Sec id. 
51. See id. at 1 :37-:ls. 
55. !d. at 1 :Js. 
56. /d.at111. 
57. /d. 
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would respond to the overall educational needs of the 
community and its children. 58 
E. Fields v. Palmdale School District 
In Fields v. Palmdale School District,59 decided in 2005, 
parents sued a California school district after school authorities 
administered a psychological assessment questionnaire to their 
elementary-school-aged children that contained questions on 
sexual topics. School officials gave parents advance notice that 
the questionnaire would be distributed to their children, but 
plaintiffs complained that they were not apprised that the 
questionnaire contained questions of a sexual nature.60 
Questions with sexual references included: "Touching my 
private parts too much," "Thinking about touching other 
people's private parts," and "Thinking about sex."61 
As in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., the 
California parents claimed that the school district's action 
interfered with their right to direct the upbringing of their 
children in violation of constitutional principles laid down in 
Meyer and Pierce.62 A Ninth Circuit panel rejected this claim 
outright. Citing Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc. 
with approval, the Ninth Circuit ruled that parents have no 
constitutional right "to restrict the public schools from 
providing information on the subject of sex."63 
F. C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education 
In C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education,64 another 
controversy over a school-administered student survey, parents 
sued a New Jersey school district after the district 
administered a survey to students without obtaining their 
parents' consent. This survey sought information about 
students' alcohol and drug use, their sexual activity, their 
suicide attempts, and their relationships with their parents. 65 
58. Jd. 
59. 127 F.:ld 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), aff'd as modified, 117 F.:ld 1187 (9th Cir. 2006). 
60. !d. at 1202. 
61. !d. at 1202 n.:l. 
62. !d. at 1201. 
G:l. Fields v. l'almdalt• Sch. Dist., 117 F.:ld 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006). 
61. 1:l0 F.:id !59 (:lrd Cir. 2005). 
G5. /d. at Hil. 
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The plaintiffs sued on a variety of grounds, alleging a violation 
ofthe Family Educational Records Privacy Act,66 the Protection 
of Pupil Rights Amendment,67 and also claiming that the 
administration of the survey unconstitutionally forced students 
to engage in forced speech and interfered with parents' 
constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children. 6x 
A federal trial court dismissed all claims, based partly on the 
conclusion that the student participation in the survey was 
voluntary.69 The parents appealed. 
Affirming the trial court, the Third Circuit ruled that the 
parents had suffered no constitutional injury. The appellate 
court ruled that the evidence supported the conclusion that 
student participation in the survey was not voluntary and the 
court noted that the New Jersey legislature had passed a law-
apparently in response to the events that were the subject of 
the litigation-requiring "prior written informed consent" from 
parents before they could administer student surveys in the 
public schools.70 
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that the 
administration of the student survey-even though student 
participation may have been required-did not amount to a 
constitutional violation. The court acknowledged "that 
introducing a child to sensitive topics before a parent might 
have done so herself can complicate and even undermine 
parental authority."71 The court concluded, however, that 
administration of the survey did not amount to a constitutional 
interference with parents' decision-making authority over their 
children's upbringing. 72 
G. Parker v. Hurley 
Finally, in Parker v. Hurley,73 the First Circuit, reaffirming 
the philosophy it had laid down in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and 
Safer Productions, Inc., ruled that parents of elementary school 
children had no constitutional right to bar a Massachusetts 
66. 20 U.S.C. § 12:l2g (2010). 
G7. /d. § 12:l2h. 
GH. Ridgewood Bd. of /~due., 1:30 F.:ld at ltl6. 
G9. /d. at 1 75-7G. 
70. /d. at 1H5 (citing N . .J. STAT. ANN.§ 181\::lG-:31 (2001)). 
71. !d. 
72. /d. 
7:3. 511 F.:ld tl7 (1st Cir. 200H). 
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school district from exposing their children to reading 
materials that portrayed same-sex marriage in a positive light. 
Parker is particularly pertinent because the state of 
Massachusetts had a statute in force at the time of the dispute 
that required school districts to give parents notice and an 
opportunity to exempt their children from those parts of the 
school curriculum "which primarily involves human sexual 
education or human sexuality issues."74 The Massachusetts 
Department of Education, however, had stated in an opinion 
letter that the parental-notice statute did not apply to 
"educational materials designed to promote tolerance, 
including materials recogmzmg differences in sexual 
orientation, if those materials are presented 'without further 
instruction or discussion of the physical and sexual 
implications of homosexuality."'75 
Plaintiffs in the case, David and Tonia Parker and Joseph 
and Robin Wirthlin, were "devout Judea-Christians" whose 
core religious beliefs included a belief "that homosexual 
behavior and gay marriage are immoral and violated God's 
law."76 ln 2005, the Parkers complained to their son Jacob's 
school principal after Jacob came home from school with a 
picture book entitled Who's in a Family, which depicted same-
sex families in a positive light.77 The Parkers claimed the 
school had an obligation under Massachusetts law not to allow 
Jacob to see the book without giving his parents notice and an 
opportunity to "opt out" of having Jacob exposed to it. Jacob's 
principal rejected the Parker's position, based on his belief that 
the Massachusetts opt-out statute didn't apply to Who's in a 
Family.n 
Joseph and Robin Wirthlin, the other plaintiffs in the suit, 
complained to school authorities after a teacher read aloud 
from the book King and King in their son Joseph's second-
grade class. 79 Like Who's in a Family?, King and a King 
portrayed same-sex marriage in a positive light. xo The school 
district rejected the Wirthlin's complaint, taking the position 
71. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § :l2A (West 2011). 
75. Parker. 51!f F.2d at 92 n.2. 
76. ld. at 92. 
77. ld. 
78. /d. at 91 n.1. 
79. !d. at 9:3. 
80. !d. 
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that the Massachusetts opt-out law did not apply to a teacher's 
reading, without further comment, from King and King to a 
class of second graders. X 1 
In the litigation that followed, a federal trial court 
dismissed the two families' claims, and the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the trial court on appeal. Ruling very much 
in harmony with its 1995 decision in Brown, the First Circuit 
stated, "Public schools are not obliged to shield individual 
students from ideas which potentially are religiously offensive, 
particularly when the school imposes no requirement that the 
student agree with or affirm those ideas, or even participate in 
discussions about them."iQ The court did not address the issue 
of the plaintiffs' statutory right to exempt their children from 
instruction on sex education or human sexuality. Instead, it 
dismissed all state claims without prejudice and invited the 
families to pursue those claims in state court. 
Mozert, Brown, Parents United, Leebaert, Fields, Ridgewood 
Board of Education, and Parker are not identical in their 
reasoning. For example, although most of the decisions 
considered the scope of a parents' constitutional right to direct 
the upbringing of the parent's child as articulated in Pierce and 
Mozert, Parents United did not rely on Pierce. Also, in the 
Leebaert decision, the plaintiff went beyond arguing that he 
had a right to shield his child from exposure to sexual topics. 
Turk Leebaert maintained that he had a constitutional right to 
shield his son from the entire health education course. 
Nevertheless, these seven federal appellate decisions, when 
taken together, lead to one incontrovertible conclusion: parents 
have no constitutional right to exempt their children from 
participating in school learning activities based on the parents' 
religious or moral views. 83 
81. /d. 
82. /d. at 106. 
8:1. nut see Emily J. Brown, Note, When Insiders IJecome Outsiders: Parental 
Objections to Public School Sex Hducation Prowams, 59 DVKF: L..J. 109 (200~l) (arguing 
that parents have a fundamental right to dired their children's moral and educational 
upbringing that includes the right to exempt their children from objectionable sex 
education programs in public schools). 
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III. IN MOST STATES PARENTS HAVE A STATUTORY RIGHT TO 
OPT OUT THEIR CHILDREN FROM SOME PARTS OF THE 
CURRICULUM, MOST COMMONLY SEX EDUCATION 
As the discussion in the previous section makes clear, 
federal appellate courts have ruled that parents have virtually 
no constitutional right to remove their children from any part 
of the public school curriculum, even if the parents' objection is 
based on religious or moral grounds. Nevertheless, although 
federal courts do not allow curriculum opt-outs on 
constitutional grounds, most states have statutes or 
administrative regulations that grant curricular exemptions in 
varying situations for public schools. As explained below, co-
author Kevin Rogers identified all statutes or administrative 
regulations in all fifty states and the District of Columbia that 
grant parents a specific right to excuse their children from 
some part of the public school curriculum. These statutes and 
regulations were then categorized into three groups: states 
with opt-out laws that are "restrictive," states with opt-out 
laws that are "permissive," and states that are categorized as 
"non-existent" (meaning that these states have no curriculum 
opt-out law). 
An examination of curriculum opt-out statutes and 
regulations shows that terminology varies widely. In many 
statutes, terminology other than "opt-out" is used. For example, 
terms such as exempt, excuse, allow to withdraw from, and 
choose not to participate in are often used in curriculum opt-out 
statutes. In some states, students can be excused from only the 
specific part of the course that parents consider offensive under 
these opt-out provisions. In other states, the opt-out provisions 
allow students to miss the entire course if parents find it 
objectionable.x4 Another practice, which gives parents even 
more authority when dealing with an offensive curriculum, is 
known as "opt-in." In states where the opt-in applies, public 
schools are only allowed to include students in particular 
courses, such as sex education or comprehensive health, after a 
parent is notified of the content and grants specific written 
permission for their child to be enrolled in the course prior to 
any instruction. xs 
8!1. See, e.!{., 'l'r•:x. Euuc. Corn: ANN.§ 2G.010 (West 2009). 
85. See, e.g., Corn. R~:v. STAT. § 22-25-101(6)(b) (2011) ("School officials shall 
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In addition, although a core purpose of all these curriculum 
opt-out statutes and regulations is to give parents the right to 
excuse their children from at least some parts of instruction on 
human sexuality, states define instruction on human sexuality 
differently. Some states use the term "family life education" in 
their opt-out provisions. Maine, for example, defines "family 
life education" as education in K-12 regarding human 
development and sexuality, including education on family 
planning and medically accurate and age-appropriate 
information about sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). X6 
Virginia describes family life education to include family living 
and community relationships, human reproduction and 
sexuality, and the etiology, prevention, and effects of STDs.x7 
Other jurisdictions define instruction on human sexuality 
as health education. For example, Delaware's K-12 health 
education program includes addressing "tobacco, alcohol and 
other drugs; injury prevention and safety; nutrition and 
physical activity; family life and sexuality; personal health and 
wellness; mental health; and community and environmental 
health."xx The District of Columbia also uses the term "health 
education," which includes the following content areas: tobacco, 
alcohol and other drug education; CPR, first aid and safety; 
injury and violence prevention; human sexuality and family; 
nutrition and dietary patterns that contribute to disease; 
prevention and control of disease; and consumer and 
environmental health. X9 
In many states, sex education prescribes how instruction on 
human sexuality is to be presented. In Missouri, instruction on 
human sexuality and STDs must be medically accurate; 90 and 
instruction must present abstinence from sexual activity as the 
preferred choice. 91 Missouri law also requires sex education 
instruction to emphasize STDs as serious health hazards and 
to stress the dangerous connection of sexual activity to human 
rPceiv'~ prior written approval from a parent or guardian before his or her child may 
participate in any program discussing or teaching sexuality and human 
reproduction.'"). 
86. ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 1902 (1-A) (201 0). 
87. VA. COllE ANN. § 22.1-207.1 (West 2011). 
88. 11 DEL. ADMIN. COllE§ 851.1.1.:l (2010). 
89. D.C. MUN. i{EUS., tit. 5, § 2:3.04 (2001), available at http://www.youthdPvclop 
mPnt.org/ad/dc.htm. 
90. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 170.015.1 (West 2010). 
91. /d. § 170.()15.1(1). 
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immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS). 92 In addition, Missouri requires sex 
education instruction to include conversations about the 
possible emotional and psychological consequences of 
preadolescent and adolescent sexual activity and the 
consequences of adolescent pregnancy93 as well instruction that 
advises students of the laws pertaining to their financial 
responsibility to children born in and out of wedlock.94 
Similarly, Arizona school districts with sex education 
curricula are required to "include instruction on the laws 
relating to sexual conduct with a minor for pupils in grades 
seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve."95 Arizona's sex 
education curriculum is outlined in administrative regulations 
and emphasizes abstinence from sexual intercourse, the 
consequences of STDs, and the emotional and psychological 
consequences of preadolescent and adolescent sexual 
intercourse and pregnancy. Arizona also prescribes sex 
education to include information pertaining to the financial 
responsibilities of parenting and legal liabilities related to 
sexual intercourse with a minor.96 
Many states include instruction about HIV/AIDS as part of 
their sex education curriculum. New Mexico requires 
HIV/AIDS instruction to at least include: (a) definition of HIV 
and AIDS; (b) the symptoms and prognosis of HIV/AIDS; (c) 
ways HIV/AIDS are spread; (d) ways to reduce the risks of 
contracting HIV/AIDS, stressing abstinence; (e) societal 
implications and resources for medical care. 97 Rhode Island law 
defines the state's AIDS curricular requirements to include 
giving accurate information on the transmission of AIDS with 
an emphasis on prevention through sexual abstinence. 9H For a 
complete list of the type of curriculum opt-outs allowed by each 
state, see Table 1. 
92. !d. § I 70.0151. I (2). 
9:3. !d.§ 170.015.1(1). 
9·1. I d. § 170.015.1 (6). 
95. i\.mz. I{ IN. STAT. i\.NN. § 15-10-2.:3 (201 0). 
96. i\.iUZ. i\.Dl'vll!'-1. Com:§ R7-2-:lO:l. :l(B) (2010). 
97. N.M. COlli<: !{. § 6.12.2.1 O(C)(:J) (LexisNexis 20 I 0). 
9H. IU. GEN. LAWS i\.NN. § H:i-22-17(1\.) (West 201 0). 
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A. Classification of States Based on Opt-Out Statutes 
Based on the review of statutes, administrative codes, and 
education codes, each of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia can be classified into one of three categories of opt-
out provisions: non-existent, restrictive, and permissive (see 
Table 2). In this study, "non-existent," was defined to mean a 
state with no statutory or regulatory curriculum exemption 
provision. Restrictive states were defined as those states that 
allow parents to opt out of no more than two areas of the school 
curriculum. Permissive states were defined as states that allow 
parents to opt out of at least three areas of the curriculum or 
that require parents' advance permission before their children 
could be exposed to some part of the curriculum. 
Table 1 
Opt-Out Statutes by Curricular Type and by State 
Opt-out If yes, type of opt-outs 
STATE statutes s H A p D 
Alabama YES X X 
Alaska No 
Arizona YES X X X X 
Arkansas YES X 
California YES X X X X 
Colorado YES X X 
Connecticut YES X X X 
Delaware No 
D.C. YES X 
Florida YES X X X X 
Georgia YES X X X 
Hawaii No 
Idaho YES X 
Illinois YES X X X X 
Indiana YES X X 
Iowa YES X X 
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Opt-out 
STATE statutes s H A p D 
Kansas YES X X 
Kentucky No 
Louisiana YES X X 
Maine YES X X X 
Maryland YES X X X 
Massachusetts YES X X 
Michigan YES X X 
Minnesota YES X X X X 
Mississippi YES X 
Missouri YES X X 
Montana YES X X 
Nebraska No 
Nevada YES X X 
New Hampshire YES X X X 
New Jersey YES X X X 
New Mexico YES X 
New York YES X 
North Carolina YES X X 
North Dakota No 
Ohio I YES X 
Oklahoma YES X X 
Oregon YES X X 
Pennsylvania YES X 
Rhode Island YES X X X 
South Carolina YES X X X 
South Dakota No 
Tennessee YES X X X 
Texas YES X X X X 
Utah YES X X 
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Opt-out 
STATE statutes s H A p D 
Vermont YES X 
Virginia YES X X 
Washington YES X X X 
West Virginia YES X 
Wisconsin YES X X X 
Wyoming YES X 
Note. 10hio permits thn:e other curriculum opt-outs in areas of venereal disPasc'. 
Cl'l{, and grades K-G personal safety and assault prevention instruction. 
S=sex or family life education. H=health l:ducation. A=HlV/AlDS instruction. 
I'= I'. E. D=animal dissection. 
Table 2 
State Classifications by Number of Opt-out Statutes 
Ogt-out No. 
1- Opt-
STATE 0 2 >2 Ill Status 
Alabama X R 
Alaska X N 
Arizona X p 
Arkansas X R 
California X p 
Colorado X X p 
Connecticut X p 
Delaware X N 
D.C. X R 
Florida X p 
Georgia X p 
Hawaii X N 
Idaho X R 
Illinois X p 
Indiana X R 
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1- Opt- Status STATE 0 2 >2 ln 
Iowa X R 
Kansas X R 
Kentucky X N 
Louisiana X R 
Maine X p 
Maryland X X p 
Massachusetts X R 
Michigan X X p 
Minnesota X p 
Mississippi X X p 
Missouri X R 
Montana X R 
Nebraska X N 
Nevada X X p 
New X p Hampshire 
New Jersey X p 
New Mexico X R 
New York X R 
North X X p Carolina 
North Dakota X N 
Ohio X p 
Oklahoma X R 
Oregon X p 
Pennsylvania X R 
Rhode Island X p 
South X p Carolina 
South Dakota X N 
Tennessee X X p 
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1- Opt- Status STATE 0 2 >2 Ill 
Texas X p 
Utah X X p 
Vermont X R 
Virginia X p 
Washington X p 
West Virginia X R 
Wisconsin X p 
Wyoming X R 
Note. N=Non-existent (state has no opt-out statute); R=Restrictive(state has 1 or 2 
opt-out statutes, (~.g., health education); I'=Permissive(state has more than 2 opt-out 
stntutes or has opt-in ,.;tntute that requires prior parent permission for some curricula). 
1. States with non-existent curriculum opt-out statutes for 
parents 
Seven states have no curriculum opt-out statute or 
administration regulation allowing parents to exempt their 
children from some part of the curriculum. These states are: 
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
and South Dakota. While the seven non-existent states do not 
have specific opt-out statutes, it seems probable that most of 
these states allow local school boards to adopt local policies 
that permit parents to opt their children out of some curricular 
units, particularly sex education. 
2. States with restrictive or limited curriculum opt-out statutes 
for parents 
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia are classified 
as restrictive states (see Table 2). Restrictive stHtes are those 
states which have granted parents limited statutory rights to 
exercise curriculum opt-out provisions in public schools. In this 
study, for a state to be placed in the restrictive category, 
statutory rights for curriculum opt-outs must be limited to one 
or two courses or topics only. The restrictive states are 
Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, 
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New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Vermont, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
a. Opt-outs for sex education. When surveying the statutory 
rights for opt-outs within restrictive states, several subgroups 
were identified. The first and largest subgroup consists of ten 
restrictive states that allow curriculum opt-outs for sex 
education. The ten states are Alabama, District of Columbia, 
Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, 
New Mexico, and Oklahoma. Three of these states in the first 
subgroup, District of Columbia, Idaho, and Montana, allow only 
sex education opt-outs. A statute or administrative regulation 
in this subgroup might have been written without specific 
procedures to obtain an opt-out, such as that found in 
Louisiana's statute, which reads: "Any child may be excused 
from receiving instruction in 'sex education' at the option and 
discretion of his parent or guardian."99 
Idaho's statute, titled Excusing Children from Instruction 
in Sex Education, provides very specific guidelines by stating: 
Any parent or legal guardian who wishes to have his child 
excused from any planned instruction in sex education may 
do so upon filing a written request to the school district hoard 
of trustees and the board of trustees shall make available the 
appropriate forms for such request. Alternative educational 
endeavors shall he provided for those excused. 100 
A representative sex education opt-out statute, limited only 
to sex education, is found in Massachusetts law, which requires 
public schools to provide parents the opportunity to excuse 
their child from sex education curriculum through written 
notification directed to the school principal. The statute 
stresses that "no child so exempted shall be penalized by 
reason of such exemption." 101 
On the other hand, one of the more distinctive sex 
education opt-out provisions is found in a position statement 
issued by the Montana Board of Public Education, which reads: 
Any parent who believes their child is not developmentally 
ready for the particular curriculum content information 
adopted by the local district may ask to have their individual 
child taken out of class when the information in question is 
99. LA. HEV. STAT. ANN.§ 17:281(D) (2010). 
100. IDAHO Com: ANN.§ :J:l-1611 (2010). 
101. MASS. GE~. LAWS ANN. ch. 71. § :l2a (WPst 2010). 
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presented. This may be an alternative offered to parents by 
local schools when human sexuality education or sensitive 
topics are presented. This allows the parent of an individual 
student the opportunity to say "Do not teach this to my child"; 
it does not give that parent the right to say "Do not teach this 
to any child." 102 
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b. Opt-outs for sex education and AIDS instruction. Six 
restrictive states-Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Montana, and Oklahoma-form the second subgroup; each has 
an opt-out statute for the combination of sex education and 
AIDS instruction. For example, Alabama law allows "any child 
whose parent presents to the school principal a signed 
statement ... of such subjects that conflict with the religious 
teachings of his church [to] be exempt from such 
instruction." 103 A Missouri statute requires that the school 
district notify each parent of "the basic content of the district's 
or school's human sexuality instruction to be provided to each 
student ... and the parent's right to remove the student from 
any part." 104 The Missouri law also includes the instructional 
requirement that districts provide the latest information about 
STDs including HIV and AIDS. 105 Another example that covers 
both sex education and HIV/AIDS instruction is found in 
Oklahoma's statutes. Oklahoma law provides that, "[n]o 
student shall be required to participate in AIDS prevention 
education if a parent or guardian of the student objects in 
writing to such participation," 106 and that, "[n]o student shall 
be required to participate in a sex education class or program 
which discusses sexual behavior or attitudes if a parent or 
guardian of the student objects m writing to such 
participation." 107 
c. Opt-outs for HIV I AIDS instruction only. The third 
subgroup is comprised of New York, 10g West Virginia, 109 and 
102. MONTANA OFFICE OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, CURRICULUM GUIDELINES FOR 
HIV/Al DS EDUCATION 2G (1999). available at http://opi.mt.gov/pdf/H lVED/Curric 
l'lanGuide.pdf. 
JO:l. AIA Com:§ 16-11-G (2010). 
101. Mo. I{EV. STAT.§ 170.015.1 (2010). 
105. /d. 
106. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70. § 11-10:J.il(C) (2010). 
107. /d.§ 11-105.1. 
1 Oi:l. N.Y. COMM'H I{J<:(;. 1 il5.il(2)(i). 
109. W.VA. COilE§ 18-2-9 (2011). 
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Wyoming, 110 which possess statutes or regulations that only 
allow limited opt-outs in HIV/AIDS instruction and do not 
permit general sex education opt-outs. For example, New York 
Commissioner of Education Regulation title 8, section 
135.3(2)(i), states: 
No pupil shall be required to receive instruction concerning 
the methods of prevention of AIDS if the parent or legal 
guardian of such pupil has filed with the principal of the 
school which the pupil attends a written request that the 
pupil not participate in such instruction, with an assurance 
that the pupil will receive such instruction at home. 
In a 1996 administrative appeal, the New York 
Commissioner of Education made clear that New York 
administration regulations only permit parents to exempt their 
children from those parts of AIDS-related instruction 
"concerning the methods of prevention of AIDS" and does not 
allow a complete opt-out of AIDS-related instruction. 111 In 
Appeal of Revered Freelon Kerry, Reverend Kerry sought an 
exemption for his daughters from Watertown City School 
District's entire AIDS curriculum and child sexual abuse 
training. 112 Denied at the local level, Kerry appealed to the 
New York State's Commissioner of Education. 113 The 
Commissioner ruled against Kerry, concluding that Watertown 
City School District had correctly exempted Kerry's children 
from only the "methods of prevention" portion of the AIDS 
curriculum, in compliance with the AIDS opt-out provision. 114 
In addition, the Commissioner ruled that the district correctly 
refused to exempt the children from either the remaining 
portions of the AIDS curriculum or the child sexual abuse 
program on the grounds that it lacked the authority to waive 
these instructional requirements. 115 "The programs to which 
petitioner objects are required by State regulations that 
110. HIV/i\IDS Mom;L POLICY FOI{ WYOM!Nc; PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Sept. 1991-l) 
[hereinafter H!V/i\!DS MODEL POLICY] (on file with authors). 
111. Rev. Freel on W. Kerry, N.Y. Comm'r of Educ., Decision No. 1 :l.fi62 (March H, 
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provide no exceptions other than the exemption outlined 
above," the Commissioner ruled. 116 
Within the third subgroup, the policies of West Virginia and 
Wyoming, dealing with parental opt-outs of HIV/AIDS 
curriculum and materials, are very similar in scope to New 
York's regulation. The West Virginia regulation requires "an 
opportunity shall be afforded to the parent or guardian of a 
child subject to instruction in the prevention, transmission, and 
spread of AIDS" to "exempt such child from participation." 117 
Similarly, the Wyoming policy also allows parents, if they 
submit a written request, to have their "child not receive 
instruction in specific HIV prevention topics at school." 11 R 
While the three states of New York, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming permit HIV/AIDS curriculum opt-outs, parental 
rights are very limited because the removal from instruction is 
only specified in the area of AIDS prevention. 
d. Opt-outs for AIDS and other diseases. Pennsylvania and 
Vermont have a similar blend of curriculum opt-outs and form 
the fourth subgroup. Pennsylvania allows opt-outs for 
curriculum addressing AIDS and Vermont allows opt-outs for 
communicable diseases, including AIDS. Pennsylvania Code 
section 4.29(c) (an administrative regulation) designates, "A 
school entity shall excuse a pupil from HIV/AIDS instruction 
when the instruction conflicts with the religious beliefs or 
principles of the pupil or parent or guardian of the pupil and 
when excusal is requested in writing." Vermont allows a parent 
to excuse their children from instruction about disease (defined 
to include "HIV infection" and "other sexually transmitted 
diseases") 119 when "the teaching of disease, its symptoms, 
development and treatment, conflicts with the parent's 
religious convictions." 120 The other curriculum opt-out allowed 
by both Pennsylvania and Vermont is for animal dissection. 
Animal dissection opt-out statutes, found in fourteen states 
including Pennsylvania and Vermont, are discussed later in 
this chapter. 
e. Other restrictive states. Some restrictive states do not 
have any consistent characteristics that assist grouping with 
116. /d. 
117. 50 W.Va. Bd. of Educ. Pol.§ 2122.15. 
118. HIV/AIDS MODEL I'OLICY, supra note 100. 
119. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 1 G, § 1:11 (2010). 
120. ld. 
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other states. This final subgroup of restrictive states consists of 
exclusive combinations of statutes. For example, Iowa is the 
only restrictive state allowing opt-outs for the combination of 
both physical education (P.E.) and health education, 121 while 
P.E. is the only course students may be exempted from in 
Arkansas. 122 Iowa's statute allows students to be exempt from 
"either physical education or health courses" if the "course 
conflicts with the pupil's religious belief." 123 Arkansas law 
allows parents to remove their children from P.E. classes if it 
"will violate the student's religious beliefs and would not be 
merely a matter of personal objection." 124 In order for the opt-
out to be viable, the parent or student "must be members of a 
recognized religious faith that objects to physical education as 
part of its official doctrine or creed." 125 The last variation of an 
opt-out combination occurs in the State of Indiana with the 
subjects of health education and hygiene. Under Indiana law, 
hygiene and sanitary science instruction must "explain the 
ways that dangerous communicable diseases are spread and 
the sanitary methods for disease prevention and restriction." 126 
A student may be excused if his parent "objects in writing, to 
health and hygiene courses because the courses conflict with 
the student's religious teachings." 127 
The most common statutory right for parental opt-outs, 
occurring in ten of the eighteen restrictive states, is for sex 
education. To be classified as a restrictive state, parents are 
allowed either one curriculum opt-out or a combination of two 
curriculum opt-outs. Most of the restrictive states, fourteen of 
the eighteen, allow curriculum opt-outs in two curricular areas. 
Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, and West Virginia are 
the restrictive jurisdictions that statutorily permit an opt-out 
in only one curriculum area. 
121. lOW.\ COllE§ 256.11 (2010). 
122. Al{K. COllE AN.\1. § 6-16-1:)2 (2011). 
12:l. IOWA COllE~ 256.11(()) (2010). 
121. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6- Hi-1 :l2 (b)(1)(B)(ii)(a)(b). 
12fi. !d. 
12(). INIJ. CODE§ 20-30-5-9 (a) (2011). 
127. ld. § 20-:l0-5-9 (d). 
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3. States with Permissive or Broad Curriculum Opt-Out 
Statutes for Parents 
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The last classification of states is perm~sswe, which 
constitutes a much broader stance of parental rights using 
curriculum opt-outs in public schools. In this study, twenty-six 
permissive states have granted parents broad statutory rights 
to exercise curriculum opt-out provisions in public schools (see 
Table 2). States labeled in the permissive category must have 
statutory rights for curriculum opt-outs that meet one or both 
of the following criteria: (1) more than two courses or topics are 
allowed for opt-out, and/or (2) opt-ins required before students 
can even enroll in a course. Permissive states are Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. As with restrictive 
states, several subgroups can be identified after surveying the 
statutory rights for opt-outs within permissive states. 
a. Opt-outs for sex education. The first and largest subgroup 
of permissive states consists of twenty-five states, all of which, 
with the exception of Ohio, allow opt-out provisions for sex 
education. Unlike many of the restrictive states, sex education 
opt-outs are just one of several exemptions allowed by most 
permissive states. One of the more intriguing statutes in this 
subgroup is a California opt-out statute that acknowledges that 
it is the parents' responsibility for "imparting values regarding 
human sexuality to their children" as follows: 
It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage pupils to 
communicate with their parents or guardians about human 
sexuality and supervise their children's education on these 
subjects. The Legislature intends to create a streamlined 
process to make it easier for parents and guardians to review 
materials and evaluation tools related to comprehensive 
sexual health education and HIV/AIDS prevention education, 
and, if they wish, to excuse their children from participation 
in all or part of that instruction or evaluation. The 
Legislature recognizes that while parents and guardians 
overwhelmingly support medically accurate, comprehensive 
sex education, parents and guardians have the ultimate 
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responsibility for imparting values regarding human 
sexuality to their children. 12X 
While California's code is unusual due to its parental focus, 
Washington's opt-out statute addresses sex education opt-outs 
without the parental focus and is representative of many 
permissive states. Washington's statute is composed of four 
common components: (1) "any parent who wishes to have his or 
her child excused from instruction in sexual health education 
may do so filing a written request"; (2) the request must be 
filed "with school district board of directors or its designee, or 
the principal of the school"; (3) "any parent may review the sex 
education curriculum"; and (4) "students may not be penalized 
as a result of being excused from sex education curriculum." 129 
These four components are common to most permissive states. 
b. Ohio. As previously mentioned, Ohio is the only state 
that does not specifically allow opt-outs for sex education 
curriculum. Ohio forms the second and smallest subgroup of 
permissive states. While Ohio does not allow sex education opt-
outs, the state requires public schools to grant opt-outs in three 
curricular areas, not found in any other states: "instruction in 
venereal disease education," "personal safety and assault 
prevention" in kindergarten through sixth grade, and 
"cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)." 130 All Ohio curricular 
exemptions require a "written request of the student's parent 
or guardian." 131 
c. Opt-outs for HIV I AIDS instruction. Two other large 
subgroups deal with HIV/AIDS and health curricula. The third 
permissive subgroup, consisting of twenty-two of the twenty-six 
permissive states, allows opt-outs for HIV/AIDS instruction. 
However, Colorado, Michigan, Mississippi, and South Carolina 
do not specifically mention HIV/AIDS instruction in their 
statutes. Florida's 2009 Statute is representative of the 
majority of permissive states' statutes because it explicitly 
mentions but encompasses more than HIV/AIDS instruction, as 
follows: 
Any student whose parent makes written request to the 
school principal shall he exempted from the teaching of 
128. CAL. EllUC. COllE§ fi19:17 (WPst 2010). 
129. WASIL REV. COJm § 28A.:l00.175(6) (2011). 
1 :JO. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § :J:ll :l.60(5)(c)(d). (8)(WPst 2011 ). 
1 :n. Id. 
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reproductive health or any disease, including HIV/AIDS, its 
symptoms, development, and treatment. A student so 
exempted may not be penalized by reason of that exemption. 
Course descriptions for comprehensive health education shall 
not interfere with the local determination of appropriate 
curriculum which reflects local values and concerns. 132 
453 
d. Opt-outs for all health education. The fourth subgroup, 
consisting of seventeen of the twenty-six permissive states, 
provides opt-outs for health courses or comprehensive health 
education. The states of Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin allow parents to remove their 
children from any or all parts of health classes. A prototypical 
statute for health curriculum opt-outs, similar to the sex 
education statutes, is found in South Carolina's opt-out law: 
A public school principal, upon receipt of a statement signed 
by a student's parent or legal guardian stating that 
participation by the student in the health education program 
conflicts with the family's beliefs, shall exempt that student 
from any portion or all of the units on reproductive health, 
family life, and pregnancy prevention where any conflicts 
occur. No student may be penalized as a result of an 
exemption. School districts shall use procedures to ensure 
that students exempted from the program by their parents or 
guardians are not embarrassed by the exemption. 133 
New Jersey's opt-out statute, more simplified and generic 
than South Carolina's code, permits parents to excuse their 
children from "any part of instruction in health, family life 
education or sex education that is in conflict with his 
conscience or sincerely held moral or religious beliefs." 134 
e. Opt-ins. The seven permissive states of Colorado, 135 
Maryland, Michigan, 136 Mississippi, 137 Nevada, I3R North 
Carolina, 139 and Utah 140 form the fifth subgroup with st::1tutes 
1 :l2. FIA STAT. § 100:l.12(:l) (2010). 
1:3:3. S.C. CODE AN:-.1. § 59-:32-50 (2010). 
1:31. N .• J. STAT. ANN. § 1 HA::l5-1. 7 (West 2010). 
1:35. COLO. i{EV. STAT. § 22-2:1- 101(6)(b) (2010). 
1:lG. MICH. ADMIN. COllEr. :lH0.1507(:l) (2010). 
1:37. MISS. CODJ•:ANN. § :37-1:l-17:l (2010). 
1 :li:l. NEV. REV. STAT.§ :389.065 (2010). 
1:cl9. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 115C-H(d)(7) (2010). 
HO. UTAH ADMIN. IWLE r. 277-171-1 (2011). 
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that mandate curriculum opt-ins. An opt-in is different from an 
opt-out and empowers parents dealing with a controversial 
public school curriculum because it requires prior approval by 
parents before their children may be enrolled in a specific 
course. This mechanism reduces the possibility that their 
children might come into contact with objectionable subject 
matter. States requiring opt-ins are categorized as permissive 
because opt-ins grant very deliberate and extensive parental 
rights when dealing with curricula. In all eight of the opt-in 
states, parents must give prior written consent for students to 
participate in sex education courses. A public schools' receipt of 
prior written approval by parents is a critical component of opt-
ins. For example, Utah's opt-in statute mandates that 
"students may not participate in human sexuality instruction 
or instructional programs . . . without pnor affirmative 
parent/guardian response on file." 141 
The advance opportunity for parents to receive ''an 
overview of the topics and materials" 142 and even the "prior 
opportunity to review materials used in the course" 143 are key 
components of opt-ins. Colorado and Michigan statutes 
exemplify opt-in guidelines. Colorado's statute states: 
School officials shall receive prior written approval from a 
parent or guardian before his or her child may participate in 
any program discussing or teaching sexuality and human 
reproduction. Parents must receive, with the written 
permission slip, an overview of the topics and materials to be 
presented in the curriculum. 144 
Michigan provides for pupil opt-ins with an administrative 
regulation which states: 
A pupil shall not be enrolled in a class in which the subjects of 
family planning or reproductive health are discussed unless 
the pupil's parent or guardian is notified in advance of the 
course and the content of the course, is given a prior 
opportunity to review the materials to be used in the course, 
and is notified in advance of his or her right to have the pupil 
111. !d. 
112. CoLO. RI•;V. STAT. § 22-25- 101(G)(b) (2010). 
11il. MICH. ADMIN. Com; r. :J80.1507Ul) (2010). 
111. COLO. RIW. STAT.§ 22-25-101 (6)(b). 
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excused from the class. The state board shall determine the 
form and content of the notice required in this subsection. 145 
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While six of the seven opt-in states, excluding Michigan, 
only permit opt-ins or opt-outs for not more than two courses or 
curricular topics, the criterion used for restrictive states, all 
opt-in states are classified as permissive states. For this study's 
purpose, any state that implements curriculum opt-ins 
overrides the number of courses allowed for opt-outs due to the 
empowerment effect for parents. This broad parental right to 
control whether a child even enrolls in a certain course, or 
opting in, warrants classification of an opt-in state as 
permissive. 
In 2009, a bill was introduced in the Tennessee legislature 
that would "[require] local education agencies (LEAs) to obtain 
written permission from parents or guardians for students to 
take family life courses." 146 If this legislation is enacted, 
Tennessee would become the eighth state to require parents to 
opt in to instruction on sexual topics. Currently, Tennessee law 
makes the teaching of sex education a Class C misdemeanor 
unless the course is authorized by the State Board of Education 
and the local school board and teacher is deemed qualified by 
the local school board. 147 
f Opt-outs for physical education. South Carolina and 
Washington form the sixth subgroup of permissive states by 
allowing opt-outs specifically for physical education. Both 
states, while emphasizing the importance of being "physically 
fit" in their statutes, still allow exemptions based on religious 
objections. For example, South Carolina law provides: 
The parent and student must show that the student's 
attending physical education classes will violate their 
religious beliefs and would not be merely a matter of personal 
objection; and the parent or student must be members of a 
recognized religious faith that objects to physical education as 
part of its official doctrine or creed. 14~ 
The State of Washington addresses its P.E. opt-out by 
providing flexibility to parents to allow their children to be 
"excused ... on account of physical disability, employment, or 
11fl. MICH. ADMIN. CODEr. :l80.1507(il). 
116. H.R. 0218, 106th Gen. As;;em. Reg. Sess. (l'enn. 2009). 
117. TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1005 (2010). 
118. S.C. Com; ANN. § i19-29-SO(B)(2)(a)-(b) (2010). 
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religious belief, or because of participation in directed athletics 
or military science and tactics or for other good cause." 149 
g. Opt-outs for any class. Three permissive states, Arizona, 
Minnesota, and Texas, form the last subgroup. These states are 
the most permissive of all because they have the broadest 
curriculum opt-out statutes for parents. These statutes grant 
extensive statutory rights to parents, permitting opt-outs for 
any class, school activity, and instructional materials in which 
parents object. There are no specific courses or topics listed 
such as sex education, comprehensive health education, 
HIV/AIDS instruction, P.E., animal dissection as seen in all 
other statutes. Arizona's opt-out law mandates school districts 
to develop guidelines "by which parents who object to any 
learning material or activity on the basis it is harmful may 
withdraw their children from the activity or from the class or 
program." 150 Minnesota's opt-out law is very similar because it 
also ensures parental rights to review instructional materials, 
and "if the parent, guardian, or adult student objects to the 
content, to make reasonable arrangements with school 
personnel for alternative instruction." 151 
Texas may have the most permissive opt-out statute in the 
U.S. Although federal case law does not generally support 
parental rights in public education, Texas statutory law 
provides significant support for parents. The Texas Education 
Code sets forth the mission and objectives of Texas public 
schools. The very first objective listed in this section of the 
statute declares, "Parents will be full partners with educators 
in the education of their children." 152 Texas Education Code 
Chapter 26 is another entire chapter dedicated solely to 
"Parent Rights and Responsibilities." In Chapter 26 of the 
Texas Education Code, parents' rights are discussed and 
include procedures to appeal denied complaints, access to 
student records, access to teaching materials, requests for 
public information, student directory information, and 
exemption from instruction. Section 26.010 of the Texas 
Education Code is the curriculum opt-out provision for Texas. 
It allows parents to deliver a written request to the teacher of 
119. WASH. REV. COllE§ 28A.2:J0.050 (2010). 
150. i\iUZ. HEV. STAT. i\.:-.JN. § 15-10-2.:3 (2010). 
151. MIN:-.1. STAT.§ 120B.20 (2010). 
152. Tt•:x. EIJUC. Com; ANN.§ 1.001 (West 2010). 
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the child to remove them from objectionable instruction. This 
broad opt-out provision asserts: 
(a) A parent is entitled to remove the parent's child 
temporarily from a class or other school activity that conflicts 
with the parent's religious or moral beliefs if the parent 
presents or delivers to the teacher of the parent's child a 
written statement authorizing the removal of the child from 
the class or other school activity. A parent is not entitled to 
remove the parent's child from a class or other school activity 
to avoid a test or to prevent the child from taking a subject for 
an entire semester. (b) This section does not exempt a child 
from satisfying grade level or graduation requirements in a 
manner acceptable to the school district and the agency. 153 
The Texas statute recognizes both religious and moral 
beliefs as grounds for exempting students from instruction. 
While section 26.010 grants broad permissive rights to parents, 
in regards to unlimited curricular courses or topics, it also 
limits parents from exempting their child to "avoid a test," 
"taking a subject for an entire semester," and "satisfying grade 
level or graduation requirements." 154 
4. Animal dissection opt-outs 
Animal dissection opt-outs are currently provided by 
statute by fourteen states. California, Florida, Illinois, New 
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Virginia give statutory rights for animal 
dissection opt-outs. Four other states, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, and New Mexico, have department of education 
policies that allow students to object to dissection and request 
an alternative assignment. These opt-outs usually require prior 
notification from the school to parents if animal dissection is 
part of its curriculum, including procedures on choosing 
alternatives without penalty. 
Representative of animal dissection opt-out statutes 1s 
Oregon's dissection opt-out law which states: 
(1) A K-12 public school student may refuse to dissect any 
vertebrate or invertebrate animal or the parent or legal 
guardian of a K-12 public school student may refuse to allow 
the student to dissect any vertebrate or invertebrate animal. 
1fi:l. /d.~ 26.010. 
151. /d. 
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(2) A school district that includes dissection as part of its 
coursework shall permit students to demonstrate competency 
in the coursework through alternative materials or methods 
of learning that do not include the dissection of animals. 
These alternative materials and methods may include but are 
not limited to: 




(e) Computer programs; 
(f) Clay modeling; and 
(g) Transparencies. 155 
New Mexico's dissection opt-out policy (set forth in an 
administrative regulation rather than a statute) is similar to 
Oregon's dissection opt-out law. The New Mexico dissection 
opt-out policy mentions "alternative techniques" to dissections 
such as "using computer two-dimensional or three-dimensional 
simulations, videotape or videodisk simulations, take-apart 
anatomical models, photographs, or anatomical atlases." 156 
Alternative to animal dissections are increasing. In March 
2010, was introduced in the Connecticut legislature that would 
"prohibit a school district from requiring any student who 
raises a conscientious objection to dissection." 157 
State laws allowing families to opt out of classroom 
activities involving animal dissection are not directly related to 
opt out laws that allow parents to shield their children from 
instruction on religious topics. Nevertheless, the fact that 
fourteen states allow families to withdraw their children from 
instruction on animal dissection demonstrates that state 
legislatures are willing to accommodate families that have 
reasonable objections to certain topics in the school curriculum. 
155. OR. REV. STAT. S :l:l7.:300 (2010). 
15fi. N .M. Com; R. § G.29.1.11 (B)(S) (LcxisNcxis 201 0). 
157. 11.1{ 522:l. G(:n. Asscm .. i{cg. Scss. (Conn. 2010). 
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5. Summary of state curriculum opt-out statutes and 
regulations 
As discussed above, many states provide statutory rights 
allowing parents to opt-out of all or part of courses such as sex 
education and family life education. As shown in Figure 1, the 
most common curriculum opt-out is for sex education, allowed 
by thirty-five states. Eight states are even more parent-friendly 
by prohibiting public schools from teaching sex education to 
children unless the parents affirmatively give their permission. 
An opt-in statutory or regulatory provision requires prior 
approval by parents before their children may be enrolled in a 
specific course, reducing the likelihood that the parents' 
children might be taught objectionable subject matter. As 
Figure 1 exhibits, thirty-three states have statutes that allow 
opt-outs from HIV/AIDS instruction making it the second 
largest curricular category. Twenty-seven states, some 
restrictive and mostly permissive, allow opt-outs in their 
statutes for both sex education and HIV/AIDS curricula. The 
smallest curricular category for opt-outs is physical education, 
allowed in seven states; and it seems probable that legislatures 
in at least some of these seven states associated physical 
education with sexuality-perhaps believing that physical 
education classes is where sex education is most often taught. 
Figure 1. State opt-out levels by subject area. 











Sex Ed Health HIV/AIDS P.E. D1ssect1on 
Category of Curriculum Opt-Outs 
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A few states, such as New York and Ohio, provide some 
distinctive opt-out statutes or regulations. For instance, in New 
York, a parent may only opt-out of instruction that covers the 
prevention of AIDS. In Ohio, there are statutory rights given to 
parents for opt-outs from courses not seen in other states such 
as CPR, and personal safety and assault prevention. The 
procedural process is uniform with thirty-one states specifically 
requiring a written parent note in their opt-out statutes. 
Eighteen states give authority to the local education agency to 
develop the procedure for curriculum opt-outs. Specific 
statutory and regulatory provisions are set forth in the 
appendix. 
Texas may have the most permissive curriculum opt-out 
law in the U.S. 15 ~ Since the adoption of the statute in 1995, 
there has been no published litigation over opt-outs in Texas. 
Apparently, the state's curriculum opt-out law has created no 
legal problems for Texas public schools in spite of its 
permissiveness. In fact, having such a permissive law may help 
Texas school administrators defuse tensions when they are 
confronted by parents objecting to some curricular element, 
whether sex education, evolution, HIV/AIDS instruction, 
animal dissection, the celebration of Halloween, etc. The Texas 
curriculum opt-out law recognizes that parents are a critical 
part of the educational process and that it is important to 
value, within limits, their input into curricular decisions in 
public schools. The Texas curriculum opt-out statute and all of 
the other states' opt-out statutes are practical and sensible 
ways to help both parents and school administrators. 
IV. SEX EDUCATION LAWS AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
A number of states include fairly specific directions to 
school districts about the manner in which sex education must 
be taught. ln particular, several states direct that sex 
education should emphasize abstinence from sex prior to 
marriage and that sexual relations should only occur inside of 
marriage. 159 In Florida, for example, school districts are 
151:1. 'J'I<:X. EllUC. CO!Jp; ANN. § 2G.010 (West 2011). 
159. See. e.g. IND. COilE § 20<!0-5-1:!(:1) (2011) (sex education should include 
"instr·uction that the best way to avoid sexually transmitted diseases and other 
associated health probh,ms is to establish a mutually faithful monogamous relationship 
in the contl,Xt of marriage"). 
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required to "[t]each abstinence from sexuality outside of 
marriage as the expected standard for all school-age students" 
and to emphasize the benefits of "monogamous heterosexual 
marriage." 160 In other states, sex-education laws do not define 
marriage to preclude same-sex marriage, but it seems likely 
that state legislatures intend that references to marriage in sex 
education statutes mean heterosexual marriage. 
In a few states, sex education statutes specifically bar any 
positive presentation of homosexuality. Arizona, for example 
prohibits school districts from engaging in any instruction that 
"[p]romotes a homosexual lifestyle," "[p]ortrays homosexuality 
as a positive alternative life-style," or "[s]uggests that some 
methods of sex are safe methods of homosexual sex." 161 Arizona 
law also prohibits sex-education instruction from including any 
teaching about "abnormal, deviate or unusual sexual acts or 
practices." 162 In Arizona, sex education is required to "promote 
honor and respect for monogamous heterosexual marriage." 163 
Louisiana law specifies that "[n]o sex education course offered 
in the public schools of the state shall utilize any sexually 
explicit materials depicting male or female homosexual 
activity." 164 In South Carolina, instruction in health education 
"may not include a discussion of alternate sexual lifestyles from 
heterosexual relationships including, but not limited to, 
homosexual relationships except in the context of instruction 
concerning sexually transmitted diseases." 165 In Utah, health-
education materials may not advocate homosexuality166 or 
sexual activity outside marriage. 167 And in Alabama, school 
districts' sex education programs are required by law to 
emphasize "that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to 
the general public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal 
offense under the laws of most states." 16R 
160. FLA. STAT. § 100il.16(2)(a) (2010) (l,mphasis added). 
161. All!Z. I{EV. STAT. ANN.§ 15-716(C)(1)-(:l) (2011). 
162. Aim. ADMIN. CODE§ R7-2-:J0il(A)(il)(a) (2009). 
16il. !d. § 1{7 -2-:lO:l(A)(il)(h)(v). 
161. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 17:2t-11A(il) (2010). 
165. S.C. CoDE ANN.§ 59-:l2-ilO(A)(5)(2010). 
166. UTAH Com; ANN.§ 5:lA-12-101(l)(b)(iii) (A)(Il) (West 2010). 
1G7. !d.§ 5:lA-12-101(1)(b)(iii)(A)(IV). 
1 G8. ALA. Com;§ 1 G-10A-2(c)(8) (201 0). 
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V. A MODEL STATUTE TO PERMIT PARENTS TO EXEMPT THEIR 
CHILDREN FROM INSTRUCTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
As Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer, Inc. 169 and Parker v. 
Hurley 170 illustrate, parents may not be able to effectively 
shield their children from objectionable instruction or 
curricular activities even if they live in a state that has a 
curriculum opt-out statute. Both cases took place in 
Massachusetts, which has a parent opt-out law allowing 
parents to shield their children from instruction on sexual 
topics in the public schools. Yet in both cases, parents whose 
children were exposed to sexual topics that were objectionable 
to them found they had no legal remedy in a federal court. To 
provide parents with better legal protection from having their 
children exposed to objectionable instruction on sexual topics, 
an opt-in law-requiring schools to get parents' affirmative 
written permission before offering any instruction or curricular 
materials on sexual topics-is preferable. 
The following proposed statute, modeled after the Colorado 
sex-education opt-in law, 171 is offered as a model: 
(l)School officials shall receive prior written approval from a 
parent or guardian before his or her child may participate in 
or be exposed to any program, instructional activity, or 
instructional material that discusses human sexuality, 
human reproduction, sexual orientation, AIDS/HIV, or 
sexually transmitted diseases, or non-heterosexual marriage. 
School officials must provide parents or guardians with a 
written overview of all instruction and materials that will be 
presented to students that pertain to the subjects listed in 
this subsection at least one week in advance of presenting the 
instruction or materials to students. 
(2)If school authorities do not receive written permission from 
a parent or guardian allowing the parent's child to participate 
in a program or instructional activity described in subsection 
(1), the child must be excused from attendance without any 
academic penalty. 
(3)The state board of education shall determine the form and 
content of the notice required in this section .. 
]()9. 68 F.:ld 52;1 (1st Cir. 1995). 
170. 511 F.:ld 87 (1st Cir. 2008). 
171. COLO. ){JW. STAT. § 22-25-1 04(6)(b) (2010). 
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(4)Willful violation of this section by any public school 
employee or school board member constitutes a Class C 
misdemeanor. 
(5)A parent who prevails in litigation to enforce the rights set 
forth in this section shall receive reasonable attorney fees. 
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Families who are opposed to same-sex marriage on religious 
grounds need strong statutory protection to ensure that their 
children are not exposed to notions of sexuality and marriage 
that are offensive to their religious beliefs-especially in states 
that have recognized same-sex marriage as a legal right. Of 
course, no statute designed to give families the legal right to 
shield their children from objectionable sexual topics in the 
school curriculum will be effective if courts refuse to enforce it. 
As we saw in Brown and Parker, the First Circuit gave families 
no relief when they sought a remedy to having their children 
exposed to sexual topics they found objectionable on religious 
grounds even though the state in which they resided-
Massachusetts-had a curriculum opt-out law on the books. 
This proposed model statute cannot force a court to enforce 
the rights protected in the statute, but it does contain elements 
that will strengthen parents' position. First, the statute is an 
opt-in statute rather than an opt-out statute, which forces 
school officials to get written permission from parents before 
exposing children to programs, instructional materials, 
instructional activity that addresses sexuality. Thus, the onus 
is on school officials to get parents' permission before exposing 
children to sexual themes. The assumption behind the statute 
is that parents object to exposing their children to sexual topics 
in school unless they indicate in writing that they do not object. 
Second, the statute contains a criminal penalty, which 
makes it a misdemeanor for school employees or school-board 
members to willfully violate the law and awards parents 
reasonable attorney fees that they incur if they are forced to go 
to court to assert their rights under the law. By making a 
statutory violation a state-law criminal offense, parents are 
more likely to go to state courts rather than federal courts to 
enforce their statutory rights, where judges may be more 
sympathetic to parents' legal entitlements than the federal 
courts have shown themselves to be. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Federal case law makes it clear: parents have no 
constitutional right to excuse their children from any part of 
public school curricula, even if the parents' objection is based 
on religious or moral grounds. As the First Circuit stated in 
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 172 parents do 
not have the constitutional right to "dictate the curriculum at 
the public school." 173 In Parker v. Hurley, 174 parents believed 
the public school was indoctrinating their children about 
homosexuality in contradiction to their religious beliefs; yet the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals exclaimed that "public schools 
are not obliged to shield individual students from ideas which 
potentially are religiously offensive." 175 
In those states that now recognize same-sex marriage, it 
seems probable that the curricula will begin portraying same-
sex marriage in ways that are objectionable to many American 
families on religious grounds. 176 Nevertheless, given the 
willingness of most states to allow parents to shield their 
children from sex education, legislatures in the same-sex 
marriage states may be willing to adopt opt-out statutes that 
allow parents to shield their children from instruction that 
positively portrays same-sex marriage. In fact, in some states, 
current opt-out statutes for sex education may already be 
adequate to allow opt-outs for sexual orientation curriculum, 
a1though as Parker demonstrated, a Massachusetts sex-
education opt-out law did not protect parents who wished to 
shield their elementary-school children from exposure to 
reading materials that portrayed same-sex marriage in a 
positive light. 
This model statute is not presented as an expression of 
hostility or opposition to same-sex marriage; indeed the 
authors acknowledge that same-sex marriage has been 
recognized by the courts in some states as a constitutional right 
guaranteed by their states' constitutions. Nevertheless, 
172. 68 F.:ld 525 (1st Cir. 1995). 
17:l. /d. at G:J:l. 
171. 5H F.:id H7 (1st Cir. 200H). 
17G. /d. at 106. 
176. Jill Tucker, Uproar Oucr Lessons About Gays, Lesbians, S. F. CHHON., May 
29. 2009. at AI (reporting on parents' objedion to Calif(n·nia school district's portrayal 
of samc·scx marriage in positive light in curriculum unit about diversity). 
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families who are opposed to same-sex marriage on religious 
ground deserve the right to protect their children from 
portrayals of sexuality and marriage that offend their religious 
values. The federal courts have consistently declared that 
parents have no right under the federal constitution to shield 
their children from instruction that offends their religious 
beliefs. Therefore, statutory protection as outlined in the model 
statute is the only way to give parents reasonable protection 
from having their children exposed to instruction in the public 
schools that undermines or disregards their religious values. 
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APPENDIX 
State Curriculum Opt-Out Statutes or Regulations 
If 
STATE Classilica. Allowed, Opt-out General Statutes or 
tion type of Method lnfi.mnation Rcgulatinns 
ob_jectlon Spccilled 




Alabama Restrictive X P/N "conflicts w/ ALA. COlli 
religious teaching ~ 16-41-6 
of church" 
Alaska Non-existent None 
Arizona X X X P/N "object to any ARIZ. Rt·.\. 
Permissive learning material STAT. ANI\. 
or activity on 
' ' 
I S-1 02 
basis it is harmful ARI/. All~1!--;. 
may \Vithdraw ( 'ont 
their children. ~ R7-2-:Hl3 (sex 
because it education) 
questions beliefs 
or practices in 
sex, morality, or 
rcli!!ion" 
Arkansas Restrictive X 1'/N "parent must ARK. Colli 
show I'. E. will AI\N. 
violate student's ~ (J-\ (>-.\2 
religious hcliciS" 




('alifornia Pt:rmissivc X P/N Opt-out any or all; CAl. ;\[)Mil\. 
"parents have Colli 
ultimate ~ s 1240 
rcsronsihilily j()r ~ s \9)7 
imparting values ~ J22)) 
regarding 
sexw11ity to their 
children" 
Colorado Pcnnis~ive X X 1'/N Opt-in ll)r sexed- CoLo. Rtv. 
"'school onicials SiAl. 
shall receive prior ~ 22-2S-104 
written arrroval;" ~ 22-IS-101> 
Opt-out for health 
Connl•cticut Pennissivc X P/N ""written note shall CONN. (iF!\. 
he sufficient to STAT. 
exempt student ~ \0-16c 
from program in 
' ' 
\0-\9 
its entirety or 
form portion" 
Delaware Non-e.\.istcnt None 
()istrict of Rcstrictiv'c X 1'/N No spccitic n:ason D.C. M"" 
Columbia required RHiS. til.), 
chapter 23 
nos 
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Florida Pennissivc X 
Gcoq~ia Pcnnissivc X 
llawaii Non-existent 
Idaho Restrictive X 
Illinois Permissive X 
Indiana Restrictive X 
Iowa Restrict ivc X 
Kansas Restrictive X 
Kentucky Non-existent 








No specillc reason 
required 
'Tach local board 
shall" 
"J<nnily life and 
sex education .. 




No specific rc<-L~on 
required 
May also opt-out 
of hygiene 
Instruction 
"not required to 
enroll in P.E. or 
health if course 
conflicts with 
religious belief' 
"l:ach board of 
education 
shall . .include 
rroccdures 
whereby pupil 
shall be excused 
from any or all 
portions" 
Kcnlucky Dept or 




excused at option 
and discretion of 







No speci fie reason 
rcyuin:d 
























23 ILL. J\IJ\11~. 













LA. RLV. STAI. 
Al\"\1. 
~ 17:2XI(D) 
MJ:. Ri V. SJXI. 
tit. 22, ~ 191 L 
tit. 7, ~ ]971 
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Maryland Permissive X 
\1assachusctts Restrictive X 
Michigan Pcnni~sivc X X 
Minnesota Permissive X 
1\1 ississippi Permissive X 
Mis.osouri Re~trictive X 
Restrictive X 
.'<cbraska Non-existent 
.'icvada Pcrmissi\c X 
~llampshirc Permissivl' X 







for sex education; 





exempt their child 
from sex 
education. 
··conllict vv lth 
sincerely held 
religious beliefS'' 
for health opt-out: 
Opt-in required 
for sex education 
"I lave 
procedure . i I' 
parent object~ to 






Opt-in for sex 
education required 
Sex Fducatinn & 
IIIV/i\lllS only 
"Any parcnh who 
believes the1r 





may ask to take 
child out of class" 












J:li\.04.1 X 03 
111\.04. I X 04 
MAss. (ill\. 
LAWSch.7L 









Ma". llcpt. ol· 
l~duc. 











Mo. Rl v. s·1A1 
~1700151()) 
MONIANA 
Oi Fi<T 01· 
PI"BII(' 
\NSTKll('r!Ol'<. 














N.J. SlAT. ;\'\t<. 
~ I Xi\:.1)-4.7. 
~ I Xi\ 35-4.25 
2.c 
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J\ew Mexico Restrictrvc X X '"Each :-.chool N.M.CoDIR. 
district shall ~ 6.29.6.11 (X) 
imrlement rohcy 
that insure parents 
have ability to 
exempt their 
child" 
-.cw York Rcstnctivc X X Opt-out m N.Y. C'm1M'R 
"'method:, of Ri <• l.l5.3(2)(i) 
prevent ion 0 r N.Y. LlliiC 
AIDS" & animal LAW 9 X09 
dissection 
North l 'arolina Permissive X P/N Opt-in ftx sex N.C Citt-:. 
cducatron & STAT. 
AIDS ~ 115( '_ 
X I (d)(7)(201 0) 






Ohio Permissrvc X PiN Opt-outs Oiil<l Rl\. 
permitted in C'OiliA"'I\. 
venereal disea.-.c s s 
education: 1111.60(;\ )(5 )( 
personal safety c), (d) 
and as:-.ault q B!HO(A)(X) 
prcvcntron in 
grades K-6: and 
CI'R 
Oklahoma Restrictive X P/N Sex education & OKI A. STAt. 
AIDS prevention ~ 70-1 I -I 03.3 
~ 70-11-105.1 
Ore~ on Permissive X PiN "no pupil shall be OiC Rl v. SlAT 
required to take or ~ .136.465 
participate in any ~ 3.17.300 
in~truction in sex 
education, . 
after parent has 
reviewed 
materials" 
J,cnns} lvania R.c~trictivc X X PiN HIYiAIIJS 22 PA. Colli·~ 
instruct ion & 4.2Y 
animal dis~cction (AIIJS1111V) 





Rhode Island Permissive X PiN "Exempt ions" R.I. till\. LA\\S 
given for sex ~ 16-22-17 
education, health, ~ 16-22-IX 
AIDS instruction, ~ I (J-22-20 
& animal 
dissection 
South Carolina Pcnn1~~ivc X X X P/N Opt-out of health S.C. Colli' ANI\. 
education f()r ~ 59-32-50 
"conflicts with ~ 59-32-XO 
liunily's belie!\" 
& opt-out of P.L. 
ir"violatcs 
religious he lief'>" 
South l)akota Non-existent South Dakota None 
Dept. of Ed 
hcl icvc~ loca I l)pt-
outs arc provided 
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'l'cnncssec Permissive X P/N Opt-in f(>r liunily l'lt-:N.Com 




!Ill OXI2 & Sll 
1214) 
Broad opt-out Trx.l:iJt't. 
Texas l)crmissivc X X P/N provision but COIJI' ANN. 
"parent is not ~ 26.010 
entitled to remove 
child to avoid a 
test or prevent 
child from taking 
subject f{Jr entire 
semester " 
Utah Pcnnissi\-C X P/N Opt-In rcqll!rcd LITAII AIJMI~. 
I{Jr sex education COD!' 
r. 277-474-1 
Vermont Rc~tnctivc X X P/N Opt-outs for sex VT SI\L ;\~'.. 
education & tit Ill, 
animal dissection ~~ 134, ~12 
Virginia Pcrmis~ive X P/N Opt-outs fiJr VA. Colli A'<t>:. 
htmily lire ~ 22.1-207.1 
education & ~ 22.1-2011.(11 
animal dissection 
\Vashington Pennissivc X X PiN Opt-out:-. ll)r sex WA\II.Rl'\' 
education, Com 
lilY/AIDS ~ 2XA 2JII.(I)O 
instruction, & ~ 2XA.2311.070 
P.l:.: "rc\igiou~ ~ 2XA . .1011.47_) 
bclicf"must he 
used I(Jr P.!· .. 
West Virginia Rc~trictivc X P/N Opt-out ll1r AIDS W.VA. COD!.~ 
only IX-2-~ 
\\'isconsin Penmssivc X PIN Opt-outs in WIS. SIAl q 




\Vyoming Rc~trictivc X PIN Opt-out ilJr illY lilY/AIDS 
prevention only Molltl (>()[ !( 'l 
H>R \VYOM!!\(i 
Pt:BI I< 
S< !!oo! s 
